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San Francisco DUI Attorney Paul Burglin NCDD Journal Case Highlights - Coffey v. Shiomoto
Symptoms of Intoxication and Manner of Driving Held Valid And Relevant Basis for Rejecting Rising Blood-Alcohol Defense in Administrative License Suspension Action
Coffey v. Shiomoto (Director, Calif. Dept. of Motor Vehicles)
___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___, 2013 WL 4196651 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.)
Non-chemical test circumstantial evidence was properly considered an administrative hearing officer to reject a defense expert’s opinion that driver was under.08 percent at the time of driving notwithstanding his post-driving chemical test results of.08 and.09 (Breath), followed by blood draw that later showed results of.095 and.096 percent.
San Francisco DUI Attorney Paul Burglin NCDD Journal Case Highlights - People v. Jones
Always Poll The Jury Following A Guilty Verdict!
People v. Jones (2013) No. 1-11-3586 (Unpublished)
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.
It often seems like a waste of time and gratuitous torment, but this case demonstrates that polling a jury after a guilty verdict occasionally bears fruit.
A guilty verdict was announced by the foreperson following deliberations. The court told the jurors it was “going to ask each and every one of you whether or not that verdict was your verdict and if it's still your verdict." After polling four jurors, the following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: Nicholas Mack, was that your verdict and is this now your verdict?
JUROR MACK: No, but yes and no.
THE COURT: Well, your answer can't be yes and no. Is that your verdict now?
JUROR MACK: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And was that your verdict when you signed the verdict paper?
JUROR MACK: No.
San Francisco DUI Attorney on constitutionality of police stops
Whether the police lawfully stopped you by reason of a reported complaint to the police about your manner of driving depends on what the United States Supreme Court refers to as “the totality of circumstances." Last month, the high court reviewed the trial court record of a vehicle enforcement stop in Berkeley, California, in a case called Navarette v. California .
In this particular case, the enforcement stop was deemed constitutional based on the following facts:
• Use of 911 system (suggestive that caller was not concerned about the report being traced back to him);
• Detailed description of driving which was consistent with the driving of an impaired motorist (i.e., it was more than just a conclusory statement that the suspect was a drunk driver - it specifically described a reckless manner of driving);
• Detailed description of car (the vehicle style and license plate number were provided)
• Description of location and direction of the vehicle was given;
NCDD Journal Case Highlights from San Francisco DUI Attorney Paul Burglin
Participation in Florida’s Discovery Scheme Mandates Defense Disclosure of Independent Blood Analysis Even If Expert Not On Witness List
Kidder v. State , 117 So.3d 1166 (2013) (No. 2D12-3535)
Florida District Court of Appeal (2 nd District)
In Florida, a defendant’s election to participate in statutory discovery (which includes depositions) triggers a reciprocal requirement of disclosure. This includes the blood-alcohol report of a defense expert even if the defense does not intend to call him or her as witness. If the defense does not elect to participate, the only discovery that must be disclosed by the prosecution is Brady material (i.e., exculpatory discovery). In that circumstance, the prosecution does not have to send a blood split to a defense expert for independent analysis. Yet the Florida Court, while recognizing that this presents a Hobson’s Choice to the defense (have the blood sample retested, but disclose any incriminating result to the prosecution), finds no Fifth or Sixth Amendment problem with the mandatory disclosure and rejects the contention that it’s work product.
NCDD Journal Case Highlights from Paul Burglin San Francisco DUI Attorney
Attorney Advertising Held Unethical (And Subject To State Bar Discipline) Where Competitor’s Name Used As A Keyword
2010 Formal Ethics Opinion 14 (NC April 27, 2012).
Opinion of North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee rules that it is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to select another lawyer's name as a keyword for use in an Internet search engine company's search-based advertising program.
Inquiry: Attorney A participates in an Internet search engine company's search-based advertising program. The program allows advertisers to select specific words or phrases that should trigger their advertisements. An advertiser does not purchase the exclusive rights to specific words or phrases. Specific words or phrases can be selected by any number of advertisers.
One of the keywords selected by Attorney A for use in the search-based advertising program was the name of Attorney B, a competing lawyer in Attorney A's town with a similar practice. Attorney A's keyword advertisement caused a link to his website to be displayed on the search engine's search results page any time an Internet user searched for the term "Attorney B" using the search engine. Attorney A's advertisement may appear to the side of or above the unpaid search results, in an area designated for "ads" or "sponsored links."
DUI Case Highlights from Paul Burglin San Francisco DUI Attorney - McLinden v. Commonwealth
License Suspension Upheld Where Driver’s Refusal Based on Location of Blood Draw
McLinden v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Unpublished; 2013 WL 5973940
Driver’s conditional consent to blood testing constituted a refusal where he insisted upon the blood draw being at a location other than a police trailer next to a DUI checkpoint that was staffed with a phlebotomist.
Officer’s Opinion That Defendant’s Ability to Drive Was Diminished by Alcohol Impairment Should Have Been Excluded on Basis It Expressed Ultimate Opinion of Guilt
Commonwealth v. Canty
___ N.E.2d ___, Mass., 2013 WL 5912050 (Mass.) No SJC-11315
This case involves the limitation of lay witnesses (including police officers) concerning opinions about the ultimate question of guilt. Though they may testify as to a defendant’s apparent intoxication, they may not express an opinion as to whether the accused was operating under the influence.
DUI Case Highlights from Paul Burglin San Francisco DUI Attorney - State v. Berg
State v. Berg (2013)
District Court Tenth Judicial District
County of Anoka (Docket No. 02-CR-13-4444)
DUI suspects have a constitutional right to refuse consent to chemical testing absent a warrant or sufficient exigent circumstances, and the exercise of that right cannot be criminalized. See Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco , 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967).
“If the exercise of a constitutional right is criminalized the rights afforded United States citizens loses all meaning. The officer, upon learning Defendant was invoking her right to refuse a search had the ability to request a warrant and force Defendant to submit to testing. The officer chose not to get a warrant. The state’s right to test Defendant was lost at that point. Therefore, this Court grants Defendant’s motion and will dismiss County [sic] I of the complaint."
EDITOR’S NOTE: This was a win by NCDD member Charles Ramsay at the trial court level.
DUI Case Highlights from Paul Burglin San Francisco DUI Attorney - State v. Butler
Implied Consent Is Not Fourth Amendment Consent
State v. Butler
232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609
Independent of the implied consent statute, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw. If the arrestee is a juvenile, the youth's age and a parent's presence are relevant factors for a trial court to consider in evaluating whether consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances.
Are Statutes Criminalizing or Enhancing Sentences Based on Chemical Test Refusals Constitutional?
HOOVER v. State of OHIO (6 th Cir. 2013)
No. 13–3330.
Unpublished Per Curiam
2013 WL 6284256
Hoover was arrested for drunk driving and refused to take a breathalyzer test. He was charged with driving under the influence under an Ohio statute which doubles the punishment if a breath test is refused and the suspect has a prior conviction. (Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(A)(2)).
Superbowl Weekend Brings Constitutionally Suspect DUI Checkpoint Arrests
Read my article on the DUI News Blog (www.duinewsblog.org) about constitutionally suspect DUI Checkpoint operations, many of which are operated right here in California. Call me today, or send me an e-mail, if you desire a consultation about your DUI arrest.
DUI Case Highlights from Paul Burglin San Francisco DUI Attorney - Missouri v. McNeely
More On Warrantless Blood Draws - What Constitutes Consent?
In Missouri v. McNeely , which was discussed in our previous post, the United States Supreme Court affirmed its holding in a 1966 case called Schmerber v. California (several California Court of Appeal decisions in the 47-year interim had watered down and misinterpreted Schmerber , declaring that it authorized blood draws without a warrant anytime a person was lawfully arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence). In fact, Schmerber very clearly indicated that a warrant is required except in limited situations where there is no time to get a warrant.
Now that McNeely has overruled those California cases, warrantless blood draws in DUI cases present a bevy of potential issues for suppression of the evidence in the absence of consent.
Consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. California’s implied consent law (Vehicle Code section 23612) purportedly constitutes an exception where the suspect has been lawfully arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
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